In order to achieve the multi-user broadcast authentication in WSNs (Wireless Sensor Networks) defending against DoS (Denial-of-Service) attack, a multi-user broadcast authentication protocol in WSNs was proposed based on the improved ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) with partial message recovery. The authenticity of the user public key is verified by using bloom filter, which reduces the storage overhead of sensor nodes. The bogus messages are filtered using pre-authentication scheme based on one-way Hash key chain. Theoretical analyses show that, the proposed protocol can resist active attack, compromise attack, and DoS attack. Compared with DDA-MBAS, the proposed protocol reduces the energy consumption of sensor node by about 41.3% while improving the scalability.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are the key techniques in Internet of things, and can be widely applied to environmental monitoring, medical care, battlefield surveillance, disaster relief and so on. The open nature of the sensing field and wireless communication make WSNs more susceptible to passive eavesdropping, packet modification, denial-ofservice (DoS) attack, node compromise and other security threats. In WSNs, a number of users will join in WSNs and broadcast messages to the networks dynamically to query and collect the latest sensed data. Hence, multi-user broadcast authentication is indispensable for WSNs. In addition, a simple DoS attack can render a large number of resourceconstrained sensor nodes crashed (i.e., energy depletion). Therefore, a multi-user broadcast authentication protocol must defend against DoS attack. This paper focuses on multi-user broadcast authentication in WSNs and its strategy of resisting DoS attack, taking the efficiency into account.
Recent works have showed that elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC) is viable and efficient on resource-limited sensor platforms [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . For example, a 160-bit ECC fixed-point scalar multiplication takes only 0.5 second (s) on an AT-mega128L microprocessor at 8MHz [4] . ECC-based broadcast authentication in WSNs becomes a hot research topic because it overcomes the shortcoming of delayed message authentication that is intrinsic to μTESLA-like schemes. However, the WSNs that employ signature-based broadcast authentication protocols are vulnerable to DoS attack. An adversary can easily broadcast a large number of bogus messages to the networks, thus exhausting the energy of sensor nodes within one hop because the sensor nodes must carry out continuous signature verification. Therefore, it is essential that an efficient false message filtering mechanism is added to the signature-based broadcast authentication protocols in WSNs. Nevertheless, most existing multi-user broadcast authentication protocols are unable to filter the false messages with low energy consumption. Currently, the strategies of defending against DoS attack in WSNs are roughly divided into three groups. The schemes in the first group [7, 8] are based on the message-specific puzzles. The major drawback of these schemes is large transmission delay. The second group of solutions [9, 10] filters the false messages using the dynamic window. However, these schemes are only applicable to the static adversaries, and cannot prevent relay attacks. The schemes in the third group [11] [12] [13] [14] introduce hash key chain to filter the bogus messages. The schemes [11, 12, 14] are proposed to secure the messages that the sink broadcasts. Since the hash key chains are produced for the sink, the users, and sensor nodes, sensor nodes store too much keys and the scheme [13] has limited scalability. Moreover, the scheme [13] only applies to the static users.
In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient multi-user broadcast authentication protocol in WSNs with resisting DoS attack. There are four major contributions in this paper: (1) The paper proposes a variant of Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with partial message recovery [15] , which removes the modular inversion operations of the signature and verification process, for securing the users' broadcast messages in WSNs. (2) The user's ownership over his public key is proven by using bloom filter, which saves the storage space of sensor nodes. (3) Based on one-way hash key chain, an efficient bogus message filtering scheme is proposed to defend against DoS attack. The scheme generates the pre-authentication hash key chains only for the sink and the users, thus having less storage overhead of sensor nodes than the protocol [13] . Therefore, the proposed protocol provides better scalability than the protocol [13] . Moreover, the users are no longer limited to static state in the proposed protocol. (4) The total energy consumption of sensor node can be reduced by about 41.3% because the proposed protocol has shorter broadcast messages and less signature verification, compared with the protocol [13] .
The rest of this paper is given as follows. In Section 2, we propose and describe a variant of partial recovery ECDSA. Section 3 proposes a secure and efficient multi-user broadcast authentication protocol in WSNs against DoS attack. Section 4 are the security analyses of the proposed protocol. Quantitative performance analyses are given in Section 5. Section 6 presents the conclusion.
A VARIANT OF ECDSA WITH PARTIAL RECOV-ERY
The ECDSA with partial recovery proposed in [15] is a suitable candidate for WSNs because it only needs two scalar multiplications and one modular inversion in the verification process and partial message is not transmitted over the link. To reduce the computation energy consumption of sensor node, we propose a variant of the scheme in [15] , which excludes the modular inversion in the signature and verification process. The variant of ECDSA with partial recovery is described as follows.
Elliptic curve domain parameters: Let elliptic curve domain parameters D=(q, FR, a, b, G, n, h). Let E/F q be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q of characteristic q, i.e., E: y 2 =x 3 +ax+b, where a,b F q , 4a 3 +27b 2 F q * , and 2, 3. The points on E/F q and a point at infinity O form the cyclic group G. Suppose that P is a generator of G, whose order is n. One cryptographic hash function is chosen: h: {0, 1} * Z n * .
Key pair generation:
Signer A selects a random integer d in the interval [1, n-1] , and computes his public key Q=dP.
(
Then signer A publishes his public key and keeps his private key d secret.
Signature generation:
To sign a message m {0, 1}* with the domain parameters and his public/private key, the signer A does the following: (1) Chooses a random integer k [1, n-1]. (2) Computes K=kP=(x 1 , y 1 ), and r= x 1 modn. If r equals zero, then go to step (1). (3) Breaks the message m into two parts, i.e., m=m 1 ||m 2 , where |m 1 | 10B. (
If c=0, then go to step (1). (7) Computes
If s=0, then go to step (1) . Let A's signature over the message m be = (c, s). Finally, signer A sends (m 2 , ) to a verifier B.
Signature verification:
On receiving the partial message m 2 and the signature , the verifier B verifies the signature and recover the message m with A's public key Q as follows:
If X=O, the message is discarded. (4) Encode and hash X as an integer i.
If the redundancy f 1 of is incorrect, the message is discarded. (7) Recovers m 1 from f 1 , and then forms the message m.
The correctness of the signature verification: If (c, s) is A's signature for the message m, then we have s=kd(c+f 2 )modn. Therefore, the equation sP+(c+f 2 )Q=(s+ d(c+f 2 ))P=kP holds.
PROPOSED MULTI-USER BROADCAST AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL WITH RESISTING DOS ATTACKS
Design Principle
The proposed protocol should (1) meet the safe condition of broadcast authentication protocol, i.e., no adversary can forge the broadcast data packets correctly; (2) provide the revocation of user to deter compromise attack; (3) defend against DoS attack; (4) achieve good scalability; (5) packetloss resilience; (6) minimize the energy consumption of sensor node.
Protocol Description
The proposed protocol is composed of six parts: 1) System initialization. 2) User addition. 3) Message broadcast. 4) Broadcast authentication. 5) User revocation. 6) Key chain update.
System Initialization
There are some assumptions as follows: (1) Elliptic curve domain parameters are preloaded in the users, the sink, and the sensor nodes. First, the sink produces the public keys for all the users, and constructs the set S={<ID 1 , Q ID 1 >, <ID 2 , Q ID 2 >,…} [16] . The sink uses K hash functions to map the elements of S to an m-bit vector V=v
In order to keep a small probability of a false positive, we have m<L(2+| Q ID |) and m>KL, where | Q ID | is the size of Q ID .
Then the vector V is preloaded in each sensor node. For the conveniences of user addition and revocation, the sink also constructs a counting bloom filter to record the number of the set elements that hash to a location.
Each user and the sink respectively select a large random number k N ID i F q as the last element to produce their oneway hash key chains of length N by performing hash operation N times, as shown in Fig. (1) . Namely,
Here, F is a one-way hash function, i.e., F: F q F q. Assume that the sensor nodes have stored the identity of each user, the initial keys of one-way hash key chains k 0 ID i and the hash function F. Fig. (1) . One-way hash key chain.
User Addition
(1) When a user ID i joins the networks, the sink generates the key pair ( d ID i , Q ID i ) for the user and updates the counting bloom filter. The increment of vector V is computed and broadcast to each sensor node by the sink. On receiving the message, a sensor node verifies the signature of the message. If the verification of signature is successful, the sensor node updates the local vector V. (2) The user produces his hash key chain and sends the initial key to the sink. Then the sink broadcasts the identity of the user and the initial key of the hash key chain to the WSNs. The sensor node saves the user's identity and the initial key of key chain if the authentication is passed.
Message Broadcast
When the user ID i broadcast the first j message m j ID i , the user first signs the message 
Broadcast Authentication
Upon receiving the broadcast message, a sensor node does the following operations: (1) Checks if the message has ever been received. 
(5) Filters the bogus messages by validating whether the equation k r ID i = F j-r ( k j ID i ) holds, where 0<j-r<T and T is the predefined pocket loss toleration threshold and k r ID i is the current pre-authentication key stored in the sensor node. (6) Overlay k r ID i with k j ID i , which is used to filter the coming message. (7) Verify the signature of the message according to the verification part of the proposed variant of partial recovery ECDSA. If the signature verification successes, the sensor node forwards the message to its neighbor nodes. Otherwise, the message is ignored. Fig. (2) illustrates the message broadcast and authentication process.
User Revocation
If a user is compromised by an adversary, or the user wants to leave the networks, the sink will modify the counting bloom filter and broadcast the message containing the user's identity to revoke the user. Once a sensor node receives the message, it will add the identity of the user to its local revocation list. In addition, the sink needs to compute the increment of the vector V and broadcast it to the networks. Having received the increment of the vector, a sensor node will update the local vector V.
Key Chain Update
When a user's key chain is used up, the user reselects a random large number k N ID i F q as the last key of a new key chain. Then the user generates its new one-way hash key chain of length N according to Equation (7) . Afterwards, the user broadcasts the new initial key to the networks. Upon receiving the message, a sensor node will replace the key for the false message filtering with the new initial key if the preauthentication and authentication of the message succeed.
SECURITY ANALYSES

Active Attack
Firstly, the integrity of the broadcast message is ensured in the proposed protocol. When a user needs to broadcast a message M=( m j ID i , ID i , k j ID i , tt j ID i )=M 1 ||M 2 , the user first signs the message according to the variant of the partial recovery ECDSA described in Section 2. The hash value of M 2 is computed, as Equation (3), for generating the signature of the message M. Afterwards, only the second part M 2 and signature of the message M are transmitted over links. If an adversary modifies M 2 or the signature, the signature is verified unsuccessfully. Therefore, this kind of adversary cannot fool a sensor node.
Secondly, the proposed protocol can achieve source authentication. If an adversary injects a bogus message into the WSNs, the adversary cannot generate the valid signature of the message for the adversary does not know a user's private key. Therefore, a sensor node will drop the message. Even if an adversary knows a user's public key, the user's private key cannot be derived from Equation (1). To compute a user's private key from his public key is as hard as to solve the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). As a result, the valid signature cannot be generated by the adversary.
Thirdly, the proposed protocol can deter against replay attack by adding a timestamp tt j ID i to a broadcast message.
Once an adversary broadcasts a message from a previous session, a sensor node will discard the message for the timestamp that is involved in the message is not fresh. Therefore, the replay attack can be defeated in the proposed protocol.
From the three aspects above, we can conclude that the proposed protocol can resist active attack.
Compromise Attack
By using user revocation scheme, the proposed protocol can thwart the compromise attack. When a user is compromised by an adversary, the adversary can obtain the user's private key. If the adversary impersonates the user to broadcast illegal or junk messages to the WSNs, some sensor nodes will report the abnormal phenomena to the sink. Then the sink broadcasts the compromised user's identity to the networks. After receiving the revocation message, a sensor node will include the compromised user's identity in the local revocation list. Therefore, a sensor node will ignore the messages that are signed by the revoked user's private key. If a sensor node is compromised by an adversary, the users' public keys are accessed by the adversary. The adversary cannot get the users' private key from their public key unless the ECDLP can be solved. As a result, the adversary will not cause damage to the networks.
DoS Attack
Employing the broadcast authentication based on signature, the proposed protocol can achieve immediate authentication. Therefore, the proposed protocol can resist DoS attack caused by authentication delay. In addition, a typical DoS attack means that adversaries inject a large number of false messages to the networks in order to exhaust the energy and memory of the sensor nodes within one hop. The proposed protocol can defeat this kind of DoS attack by using pre-authentication scheme based on one-way hash key chain. Large numbers of false messages can be filtered by a sensor node with low energy consumption. The pre-authentication process will not cause the long message queue waiting for authentication because hash operation has very low computational complexity. Therefore, the energy and memory of sensor node will not be exhausted in a short time. Therefore, the proposed protocol can reject DoS attack.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
We compare the performance of the proposed protocol with the existing multi-user broadcast authentication protocol against DoS attack (i.e., DDA-MBAS [13] ) in terms of scalability and the energy consumption.
Scalability
In the proposed protocol, the user can join the networks at any time, or be revoked because of misbehaving and leaving the networks. For example, the MICA2 has 4KB EEPROM, 128KB flash memory of program and 512KB flash memory of measurement. The proposed protocol can support 20*1024/(20+2)=930 users if a memory space of 20KB is used for storing the users' identity and preauthentication key. Although more memory means more users, in fact, the number of user can not be too much. Otherwise, it can cause serious channel competition and even the communication block [13] . Compared with DDA-MBAS Fig. (2) . The message broadcast and authentication process.
[13], the proposed protocol generates one-way hash key chains only for the sink and each user, thereby saving the storage space of the sensor node. Therefore, the proposed protocol can support more users and thus provide better scalability than DDA-MBAS [13] . In addition, the users are not limited to static state.
Energy Consumption
Suppose that the sensor node in the WSNs is MICA2. The power level of the node is 3.0 V, the draw in active mode is 8.0 mA, the transmitting draw is 27mA, the receiving draw is 10 mA, and the data rate is 19.2kbps [17] . MICA2 mote uses IEEE 802.15.4 standard. Therefore, one packet transmitted in the physical layer is up to 133 bytes, including a packet header of 31 bytes [18] . We assume that the size of original message is 20 bytes, the size of timestamp is 2 bytes, and the size of ID i is 2 bytes. The security strength of 1024-bit RSA is as same as 160-bit ECC. One ECC arbitrary point scalar multiplication requires 1.25s on MICA2 mote, and the operation time of one ECC double scalar multiplication is 1.41s [4] .
In the proposed protocol, the size of broadcast message is 34+40+20=94 bytes. A MICA2 mote only needs to transmit one packet of 125 bytes in the physical. Therefore, the energy consumptions of transmitting and receiving one broadcast message are 3.0 27 10 -3 125 8/19,200=4.22 mJ and 3.0 10 10 -3 125 8/19,200=1.56 mJ, respectively. Assuming that N is the neighbor density, the communication energy consumption of a sensor node is 4.22+1.56N mJ. If hash operation is ignored, the signature verification requires one ECC double scalar multiplication. Then the computation energy consumption of one sensor node is 3.0 8 10 -3 1.41=33.84 mJ. As a result, the total energy consumption of one sensor node is 38.06+1.56N mJ.
In DDA-MBAS [13] , the broadcast message is < ID A , i A , [13] . Table 1 lists the comparison result of these two protocols in terms of communication overhead, communication energy consumption, computing time, computation energy consumption, and the total energy consumption. Fig. (3) illustrates the communication energy consumptions of these two protocols. The larger neighborhood den- Fig. (3) . Comparison of these two protocols on communication energy consumption.
sity N becomes, the more the communication energy consumption of the proposed protocol is reduced compared to DDA-MBAS. The reasons are (1) the proposed protocol has less communication overhead than DDA-MBAS; (2) one sensor node retransmits once and receives the same message N times.
The computation energy consumptions of these two protocols are shown in Fig. (4) . From the figure, we can observe that the computation energy consumption of the proposed protocol is less than that of DDA-MBAS. This is because the proposed protocol avoids one ECC arbitrary point scalar multiplication in the signature verification, compared with DDA-MBAS. Fig. (5) shows the relationships between the energy consumption of one sensor node and the neighbor density N in two compared protocols. There is a growing difference of energy consumption between DDA-MBAS and the proposed protocol as neighborhood density N becomes large. Compared with DDA-MBAS [13] , the proposed protocol reduces the total energy consumption by 48.73 mJ or 41.3% when neighborhood density N is 20. There are two reasons as follows: (1) the communication overhead in the proposed pro- Fig. (4) . Comparison of these two protocols on computation energy consumption. Fig. (5) . Comparison of two protocols on total energy consumption.
tocol is less than that in DDA-MBAS; (2) compared with DDA-MBAS, the proposed protocol has less commuting time in the signature verification.
As a result, the proposed protocol is more efficient that DDA-MBAS [13] in terms of scalability and energy consumption, while providing the same security level.
CONCLUSION
This paper achieves the multi-user broadcast authentication in WSNs by utilizing the proposed variant of ECDSA with partial recovery, and employs bloom filter to authenticate the users' public key in order to save the storage space of a sensor node. The pre-authentication scheme based on one-way hash key chain is designed to filter the bogus message effectively in this paper. A threshold is predefined to tolerate pocket loss. Theoretical analyses demonstrate that, the proposed protocol can defeat active attacks, compromise attacks, and DoS attacks. Particularly, the energy reduction of the proposed protocol achieves 48.73 mJ or 41.3% Compared with DDA-MBAS.
